| Автор | Ruppel, Fred J. |
| Автор | Boadu, Fred O. |
| Автор | Peterson, E. Wesley F. |
| Дата выпуска | 1991 |
| dc.description | When federalist nations are signatories to international economic agreements, potential problems arise because of the inherent conflicts between federal law and legitimate state interests. This paper presents a conceptual framework for analyzing problems surrounding negotiation, ratification, and implementation of international agreements when federations are signatories. The economic model isolates three factors (the variance of state net benefits under an agreement, individual states' opportunity costs associated with the agreement, and state-supported opportunism) as cost-increasing impediments to the successful institution of international economic agreements and highlights opportunism containment as fundamental to credible commitments in international agreements. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | Oxford University Press |
| Копирайт | Copyright 1991 American Agricultural Economics Association |
| Тема | club goods |
| Тема | federalism |
| Тема | GATT |
| Тема | international trade |
| Тема | multilateral trade negotiations |
| Тема | opportunism |
| Тема | public goods |
| Тема | trade liberalization |
| Тема | F130 |
| Тема | Q170 |
| Тема | Q180 |
| Тема | Articles |
| Название | Federalism, Opportunism, and Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture |
| Тип | research-article |
| DOI | 10.2307/1242428 |
| Electronic ISSN | 1467-8276 |
| Print ISSN | 0002-9092 |
| Журнал | American Journal of Agricultural Economics |
| Том | 73 |
| Первая страница | 1009 |
| Последняя страница | 1019 |
| Аффилиация | Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University |
| Выпуск | 4 |
