| Автор | Austen-Smith, David |
| Автор | Banks, Jeffrey S. |
| Дата выпуска | 1998 |
| dc.description | ▪ Abstract We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approaches—that in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate prediction—is indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | Annual Reviews |
| Копирайт | Annual Reviews |
| Название | SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, GAME THEORY, AND POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259 |
| Print ISSN | 1094-2939 |
| Журнал | Annual Review of Political Science |
| Том | 1 |
| Первая страница | 259 |
| Последняя страница | 287 |
| Аффилиация | Austen-Smith, David; Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208 |
