A model of human beings aspragmatists is outlined. It is proposed that the primary orientation of laypeople is toward the various practical concerns of everyday life; and therefore to concrete, particular, and everyday information, and toward specific rather than general beliefs and heuristics. Evidence for the model is reviewed. The model is then applied to human inference and attribution research. It is argued that studies of human inference err by adopting statistical, logical, and scientific criteria as optimal for the evaluation of lay inference, when lay inferences are, infact, intended to meet practical criteria. Those studies also make insufficient allowance for the fact than lay inference is adapted to the circumstances, problems and informational availability of everyday life. It is also argued that causal attributions are made not by means of theory-neutral assessment of covariation or abstract, general concepts of causation, but by the application of specific, relatively concrete preexisting beliefs, and that attributions are made in a context of and contribute to practical concerns.