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Автор KAEMPFER, WILLIAM, H.
Автор LOWENBERG, ANTON, D.
Дата выпуска 1993
dc.description Voter turnouts differ significantly across societies, and in some polities voting is compulsory. To explain differences in voter turnout it is necessary first to explain the variation in compulsion policies that exists across societies. A threshold model of collective action is used to provide an explanation for compulsion policies, which are treated as endogenous. Governments and parties are viewed as “demanding” turnout as a means to enhance political support. This theory suggests that voter turnout is high, and possibly government mandated, in societies that have high levels of political polarization and that use proportional representation. The predictions of the theory are tested using cross-country data.
Издатель SAGE PERIODICALS PRESS
Название A Threshold Model of Electoral Policy and Voter Turnout
Тип Journal Article
DOI 10.1177/1043463193005001009
Print ISSN 1043-4631
Журнал Rationality and Society
Том 5
Первая страница 107
Последняя страница 126
Аффилиация KAEMPFER, WILLIAM, H., University of Colorado, Boulder
Аффилиация LOWENBERG, ANTON, D., California State University, Northridge
Выпуск 1
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