Cambridge University Press по журналам "Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Association"
Отображаемые элементы 1-20 из 21
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)This article analyzes the later work of Michel Foucault on ethics, freedom, and self-governance as it applies to the ethics of consumption and to new ethical consumerist movements such as fair-trade coffee. Foucault's ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)This article analyzes the later work of Michel Foucault on ethics, freedom, and self-governance as it applies to the ethics of consumption and to new ethical consumerist movements such as fair-trade coffee. Foucault's ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)Any substantive notion of self-ownership presupposes well-defined property rights over external resources. Left-libertarians usually limit this category to natural resources. I argue that in a specialized economy, substantive ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)Even though Émile Meyerson is rightly seen as an opponent of Comte's positivism, analyzing passages of his works with the help of his correspondence shows the ambiguity of his relation to Comte's philosophy. Drawing on ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)A popular strategy for resolving Kim's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)A popular strategy for resolving Kim's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible—metaphysically troubling and overly general—or trivial—collapsing into deflationism's “‘P’ is true iff P.” Philip Kitcher argues for a “modest” ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008--01)
Отображаемые элементы 1-20 из 21