Cambridge University Press по журналам "Social Philosophy and Policy"
Отображаемые элементы 1-20 из 300
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1994--01)During the last forty years, the Aboriginal peoples of the Americas, of the British Commonwealth, and of other countries colonized by Europeans over the last five hundred years have demanded that their forms of property ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2010-01-01)Adam Smith raised a series of obstacles to effective large-scale social planning. In this paper, I draw these Smithian obstacles together to construct what I call the “Great Mind Fallacy,” or the belief that there exists ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1988--01)In a series of important papers, G.A. Cohen has developed a forceful argument for the claim that workers are rendered unfree by capitalist institutions. His argument poses a powerful challenge to those (such as myself) who ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1996--01)In recent years many people have suggested that rights come from traditions. More particularly, many people interested in American constitutional law have said that constitutional rights should be developed with close ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1998--01)A democratic society cannot flourish if its citizens merely pursue their own narrow interests. If it is to do more than survive, at least a substantial proportion of its citizens must fulfill responsibilities that go beyond ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1993--01)In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1996--01)The polarization of the individual and the community that underlies much of the debate between individualists and communitarians is made possible in part by the literal vanishingof civil society—the domain whose middling ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1994--01)In thinking and talking about rights, including property rights, it seems natural to put the argument in either moral or legal terms. From the former viewpoint, rights are part of a description of what actions are right ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1989--01)Imagine a society of fisherfolk, who, in the state of nature, fish on a lake of finite size. Fishing on the lake is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in labor, because the lake's finite size (and finite fish ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2008-01-01)Constructivism about practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1999--01)The philosophy of Aristotle (384–322, b.c.e.) remains a beacon of our culture. But no part of Aristotle's work is more alive and compelling today than his contribution to ethics and political science — nor more relevant ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1996--01)A major theme in discussions of the influence of technology on society has been the computer as a threat to privacy. It now appears that the truth is precisely the opposite. Three technologies associated with computers—public-key ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1988--01)David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement presents a partial theory of distributive justice. It is partial because it applies only to the distribution of gains from joint endeavors, or what we may call the ‘social surplus’ from ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1988--01)Part I of this essay will be devoted to Gauthier's principle of minimax relative concession. Part II will focus, more generally, on the variety of possible strategies available to liberal theory. In Part I, I will argue ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 2001--01)How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1993--01)What, if anything, are we morally required to do on behalf of others besides respecting their rights? And why is such regard for others a reasonable moral requirement? These two questions have long been major concerns of ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1987--01)Morality requires us to act for the good of others. This is not the only moral requirement there is, and it is, of course, controversial where the good of others lies. But whatever their good is, there can be no serious ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1997--01)Today there is a tendency to do ethics on the basis of what I should like to call the “self-other model.” On this view, an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others–and not even then, unless it is motivated by ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1996--01)Biotechnology surpasses even computer technology in predictions of its potential for revolutionary effects on humankind. It includes agribusiness (genetically engineered plants, animals, hormones, etc.) and phar-maceuticals ...
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(Cambridge University Press. New York, USA, 1991--01)Principled discussions of civil rights became inherently less likely as a direct result of the observation by Earl Warren, in Brown v. Board of Education, that, respecting freedmen, “Education of Negroes was almost ...
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