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Cambridge University Press по журналам "Utilitas"

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  • A Conflict in Common-Sense Moral Psychology
    ZIMMERMAN AARON Z. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2009-12-01)
    Ordinary thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly ...
  • A Consequentialist Distinction between What We Ought to Do and Ought to Try
    PERSSON INGMAR (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2008-09-01)
    G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example ...
  • A Critique of Sumner's Account of Welfare
    TUPA ANTON (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2010-03-01)
    Wayne Sumner, in the first six chapters of his excellent book Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, argues for what he calls an authentic life satisfaction theory of welfare. Somewhat generally, Sumner's theory of welfare is a ...
  • Act and Principle Contractualism
    SHEINMAN HANOCH (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2011-08-01)
    Unrejectability is the property shared by things no one could reasonably reject. Following the lead of T. M. Scanlon, modern contractualists hold Principle Contractualism: An act is obligatory when conformity to unrejectable ...
  • Actual Preferences, Actual People
    Goodin Robert E. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1991-05-01)
    Maximizing want-satisfaction per se is a relatively unattractive aspiration, for it seems to assume that wants are somehow disembodied entities with independent moral claims all of their own. Actually, of course, they are ...
  • Act Utilitarianism and Decision Procedures
    Frazier Robert L. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1994-05-01)
    A standard objection to act utilitarian theories is that they are not helpful in deciding what it is morally permissible for us to do when we actually have to make a choice between alternatives. That is, such theories are ...
  • Adam Smith and David Hume: with Sympathy*
    Van Holthoon F. L. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1993-05-01)
    Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic ...
  • Adjudication under Bentham's Pannomion
    Dinwiddy J. R. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1989-10-01)
  • A ‘Fundamental Misunderstanding’?
    IRWIN T. H. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2007-03-01)
    One of the many illuminating aspects of Bart Schultz's book is the recurrent theme of Sidgwick's Socratic inspiration. Some of Sidgwick's contemporaries at Cambridge were among those who gave new life to the study of ...
  • Against Dworkin's Endorsement Constraint
    Wilkinson T. M. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2003-07-01)
    Ronald Dworkin argues on the basis of a theory of well-being that critical paternalism is self-defeating. People must endorse their lives if they are to benefit. This is the endorsement constraint and this paper rejects ...
  • Against Hegemonism in Moral Theory
    Kappel Klemens (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2002-07-01)
    What I call hegemonism holds that a satisfactory moral theory must in a fairly direct way guide action. This, the hegemonist believes, provides a constraint on moral theorizing. We should not accept moral theories which ...
  • Agent-neutral Consequentialism from the Inside-out: Concern for Integrity without Self-indulgence
    Ridge Michael (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2001-07-01)
    Consequentialists are sometimes accused of being unable to accommodate all the ways in which an agent should care about her own integrity. Here it is helpful to follow Stephen Darwall in distinguishing two approaches to ...
  • Agent-Neutrality, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism … A Terminological Note*
    Skorupski John (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1995-05-01)
    It seems common at the moment to make agent-neutrality a necessary condition of ‘consequentialism” and to hold that deontological ethics are agent-relative. This note argues that both these tendencies regrettably obscure ...
  • Agent-Neutral Reasons: Are They for Everyone?
    Postow B. C. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1997-07-01)
    According to both deontologists and consequentialists, if there is a reason to promote the general happiness – or to promote any other state of affairs unrelated to one's own projects or self-interest – then the reason ...
  • Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes
    McNaughton David; Rawling Piers (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1995-11-01)
  • A. J. Ayer: An Appreciation
    Sprigge T. L. S. (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1990-05-01)
    As the editor noted in the last number Freddie Ayer, or Professor Sir Alfred Ayer, played a considerable part in launching the vast enterprise of the Bentham edition. It is fitting, therefore, that something be said in ...
  • Alan Milne
    Crisp Roger (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1998-11-01)
  • Ambiguities in Feldman's Desert-adjusted Values
    Persson Ingmar (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 1997-11-01)
    Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known ‘objection from justice’ by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved ...
  • Announcement
    Неизвестный автор (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2002-11-01)
  • Announcement
    Неизвестный автор (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK, 2003-11-01)