| Автор | GÄRDENFORS, PETER |
| Дата выпуска | 2006 |
| dc.description | This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrowʼs impossibility theorem. |
| Издатель | Cambridge University Press |
| Название | A REPRESENTATION THEOREM FOR VOTING WITH LOGICAL CONSEQUENCESMuch of this article was written while the author was a fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (SCASSS) in Uppsala. I want to thank the Collegium for providing me with excellent working conditions. Wlodek Rabinowicz and other fellows gave me valuable comments at a seminar at SCASSS when an early version of the paper was presented. I also want to thank Luc Bovens, Franz Dietrich, Christian List and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments on a later version. The final version was prepared during a stay at Oxford University for which I am grateful to the British Academy. |
| DOI | 10.1017/S026626710600085X |
| Electronic ISSN | 1474-0028 |
| Print ISSN | 0266-2671 |
| Журнал | Economics and Philosophy |
| Том | 22 |
| Первая страница | 181 |
| Последняя страница | 190 |
| Аффилиация | GÄRDENFORS PETER; Lund University |
| Выпуск | 2 |
