| Автор | Linster, Bruce G. |
| Дата выпуска | 1993 |
| dc.description | This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent‐seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two‐country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three‐country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent‐seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies’ interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is computed. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | Taylor & Francis Group |
| Копирайт | Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC |
| Тема | Rent seeking |
| Тема | alliances |
| Тема | defense spending |
| Тема | military competition |
| Название | A rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances |
| Тип | research-article |
| DOI | 10.1080/10430719308404761 |
| Print ISSN | 1043-0717 |
| Журнал | Defence Economics |
| Том | 4 |
| Первая страница | 213 |
| Последняя страница | 226 |
| Аффилиация | Linster, Bruce G.; Department of Economics and Geography, United States Air Force Academy |
| Выпуск | 3 |
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