| Автор | Epstein, Gil S. |
| Автор | Spiegel, Uriel |
| Дата выпуска | 1996 |
| dc.description | A lecturer's task is not confined to the classroom and he/she continues to guide his/her students after lecture hours. However, many students who are able to solve their problems independently often still seek the lecturer's guidance, resulting in negative externalities. In our paper, we examine the lecturer's attempts to minimize the negative effects of unnecessary guidances. Specifically, we deal with the optimal time allocation policy adopted by a lecturer who is maximizing his/her utility function, which is positively related to his/her students' level of utility. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | Carfax Publishing Company |
| Копирайт | Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC |
| Название | A Lecturer's Optimal Time Allocation Policy |
| Тип | research-article |
| DOI | 10.1080/09645299600000024 |
| Electronic ISSN | 1469-5782 |
| Print ISSN | 0964-5292 |
| Журнал | Education Economics |
| Том | 4 |
| Первая страница | 255 |
| Последняя страница | 265 |
| Аффилиация | Epstein, Gil S.; Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University |
| Аффилиация | Spiegel, Uriel; Interdisciplinary Department of Social Science, Bar-Ilan Uuniversity |
| Выпуск | 3 |
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