| Автор | Santarelli, Enrico |
| Дата выпуска | 1991 |
| dc.description | Equity financing is the optimal strategy for innovating firms, which can use their financial structure as a signalling device to attract outside investors. This situation is likely to arise when the firm undertakes a specific purpose R&D project aimed at developing a certain product innovation. Typically, innovations of this kind draw on the firm's cumulative. idiosyncratic knowledge base and, accordingly, the innovation process involves an high degree of asset specificity. Under such circumstances, the terms of debt financing will be adjusted adversely, and equity financing will represent the most economically efficient solution. These arguments are developed in standard static principal-agent models dealing with New Technology Based Firms and publicly held large firms undertaking an aggressive R&D strategy. In the case of NTBFs, two kinds of optimal venture capital contracts are considered, which render the sharing rules independent (a) of the agent's action and (b) of both the agent's action and the specific assets involved in the transaction. Regarding innovating large firms, it is argued that in this case, too, equity represents the optimal financing strategy, and that top executives use their equity share to signal the firm's expected return stream and value to outside investors. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | OPA (Overseas Publishers Association) |
| Копирайт | Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC |
| Тема | R&D Financing |
| Тема | Asset Specificity |
| Тема | Efficient Contracting |
| Тема | Agency Theory |
| Тема | Signalling |
| Название | Asset Specificity, R&D Financing, And The Signalling Properties of The Firm's Financial Structure |
| Тип | research-article |
| DOI | 10.1080/10438599100000008 |
| Electronic ISSN | 1476-8364 |
| Print ISSN | 1043-8599 |
| Журнал | Economics of Innovation and New Technology |
| Том | 1 |
| Первая страница | 279 |
| Последняя страница | 294 |
| Аффилиация | Santarelli, Enrico; University of Sussex |
| Выпуск | 4 |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Arrow, K.J. 1962. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions”. Edited by: Nelson. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Arrow, K.J. 1985. “The Economics of Agency”. Edited by: Pratt and Zeckhauser. 37–51. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Arthur, B. 1990. Silicon Valley Locational Clusters: When Do Increasing Returns Imply Monopoly?. Mathematical Social Sciences., 19(3): 235–251. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Bewley, T., ed. 1987. Advances in Economic Theory, Fish World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Burgelman, R. and Rosenbloom, R. 1989. Technology, Competition and Organization Theory, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Dean, B.V. and Giglierano, J J. 1990. Multistage Financing of Technical Start-up Companies in Silicon Valley. Journal of Business Venturing, 5(6): 375–389. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Fama, E.F. and Miller, M.H. The Theory of Finance, New York: Halt Rinehart and Winston. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Friedman, J.W. 1986. Game Theory With Applications to Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K.J. 1990. Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43(3): 30/S–51/S. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Harris, M. and Raviv, A. 1979. Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 20(1): 231–259. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Harris, M. and Raviv, A. 1990. Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt. Journal of Finance., 45(2): 1–349. 32 |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Hart, O. 1988. Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations. Canadian Journal of Economics, 21(3): 467–476. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Hart, O. and Holmström, B. 1987. The Theory of Contracts Edited by: Bewley. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Holmström, B. 1979. Moral Hazard and Obsewability. Bell Journal of Economics, l0(1): 74–91. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Holmström, B. 1989. Agency Costs and Innovation. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 12(3): 305–327. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Jensen, M.C. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow. Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2): 323–339. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305–360. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Lawriwsky, M.L. 1984. Corporate Structure and Performance, London: Croom Helm. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Leland, H.E. and Pyle, D.H. 1977. Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediaries. The Journal of Finance, 32(6): 1167–1189. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Lewellen, W.G. 1969. Management and Ownership in the Large Firm. Journal of Finance, 24(2): 299–322. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Macmillan, I.C., Kullow, D.M. and Khoylian, R. 1990. Venture Capitalists' Involvement in Their Investments: Extent and Performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 4(1): 27–47. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Mayer, C. 1988. New Issues in Corporate Finance. European Economic Review, 32: 1167–1189. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(3): 293–315. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Myers, S.C. 1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2): 147–175. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Informations That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2): 187–221. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Nelson, R.R., ed. 1962. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton: Princeton University Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. 1977. In Search of Useful Theory of Innovation. Research Policy, 5(1): 36–76. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Orsenigo, L. 1989. The Emergence of Biotechnology, London: Pinter. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Pisano, G.P. and Teece, D.J. 1989. Collaborative Arrangements and Global Technology Strategy Edited by: Burgelman-Rosenbloom. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Pratt, J.W. and Zeckhauser, R.J. 1985. Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston: Hanard Business School Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Rees, M. 1985. Theory of Principal and Agent–Part I. Bulletin of Economic Research, 37(1): 3–25. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Riley, J.G. 1975. Competitive Signalling. Journal of Economic Theory, 10(2): 174–186. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Ross, S.A. 1977. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. Bell Journal of Economics, 8(1): 23–40. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Sahlman, W.W. 1990. “Insights from the American Venture Capital Organization”. In Graduate School of Business Administration, mimeo: Harvard University. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Smilor, R.W., Gibson, D.V. and Dietrich, G.B. 1990. University Spin-Out Companies: Technology Start-Ups from UT-Austin. Journal of Busines Venturing, 5(1): 63–76. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Spence, A.M. 1973. Marker Signalling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Stiglitz, J. 1974. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies, 41(2): 219–255. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Stoneman, P. 1987. The Economic Analysis of Technology Policy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Stulz, R.M. 1990. Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(I): 3–27. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Teece, D.J. “Innovation and the Organization of Industry”. In Center for Research in Management, University of California at Berkeley. mimeo |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Williamson, O.E. 1975. “Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications”. New York: The Free Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Williamson, O.E. 1975. The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. Journal of Economic Literature, 19(4): 1537–1568. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, New York: The Free Press. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Williamson, O.E. 1988a. The Logic of Economic Organization. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4(1): 65–93. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Williamson, O.E. 1988b. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 43(3): 567–591. |
| Библиографическая ссылка | Williamson, O.E. Strategizing, Economizing, arid Economic Organization. paper presented at the Conference on The New Science of Organization, Center for Research in Management. January. pp.18–20. University of California at Berkeley. |
