Автор |
Wyatt, Geoffrey |
Дата выпуска |
1992 |
dc.description |
The implications of competitive bidding between universities and other institutes for research funding are examined. It is shown that this process of competitive rent-seeking can absorb research resources of similar magnitude to the research funds available. A basic model involving two similar ‘universities’ is set out initially. It is then shown that the overall cost of the research bidding process increases with (i) an increase in the number of bidders, (ii) an increase in the care with research proposals are scrutinized, and (iii) a decline in the dispersion of costs of proposal generation. |
Формат |
application.pdf |
Издатель |
OPA (Overseas Publishers Association) |
Копирайт |
Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC |
Тема |
Research Resources |
Тема |
Competitive Bidding |
Тема |
Nash Equilibrium |
Тема |
Rent Seeking |
Название |
Bidding For Research Initiatives |
Тип |
research-article |
DOI |
10.1080/10438599200000012 |
Electronic ISSN |
1476-8364 |
Print ISSN |
1043-8599 |
Журнал |
Economics of Innovation and New Technology |
Том |
2 |
Первая страница |
157 |
Последняя страница |
164 |
Аффилиация |
Wyatt, Geoffrey; Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University |
Выпуск |
2 |
Библиографическая ссылка |
Hare, P.G. and Wyatt, G.J. 1988. Modelling the Determination of Research Productivity in British Universities. Research Policy, 17(6): 315–328. |
Библиографическая ссылка |
Tullok, G. 1980. “Efficient Rent Seeking”. In Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Edited by: Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. Texas: Texan A&M University College Station. Chapter 6 |
Библиографическая ссылка |
Wyatt, G.J. 1986. The Economics of Invention, Wheatsheaf Press, , UK: Brighton. |