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Автор Wyatt, Geoffrey
Дата выпуска 1992
dc.description The implications of competitive bidding between universities and other institutes for research funding are examined. It is shown that this process of competitive rent-seeking can absorb research resources of similar magnitude to the research funds available. A basic model involving two similar ‘universities’ is set out initially. It is then shown that the overall cost of the research bidding process increases with (i) an increase in the number of bidders, (ii) an increase in the care with research proposals are scrutinized, and (iii) a decline in the dispersion of costs of proposal generation.
Формат application.pdf
Издатель OPA (Overseas Publishers Association)
Копирайт Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Тема Research Resources
Тема Competitive Bidding
Тема Nash Equilibrium
Тема Rent Seeking
Название Bidding For Research Initiatives
Тип research-article
DOI 10.1080/10438599200000012
Electronic ISSN 1476-8364
Print ISSN 1043-8599
Журнал Economics of Innovation and New Technology
Том 2
Первая страница 157
Последняя страница 164
Аффилиация Wyatt, Geoffrey; Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University
Выпуск 2
Библиографическая ссылка Hare, P.G. and Wyatt, G.J. 1988. Modelling the Determination of Research Productivity in British Universities. Research Policy, 17(6): 315–328.
Библиографическая ссылка Tullok, G. 1980. “Efficient Rent Seeking”. In Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Edited by: Buchanan, J.M., Tollison, R.D. and Tullock, G. Texas: Texan A&M University College Station. Chapter 6
Библиографическая ссылка Wyatt, G.J. 1986. The Economics of Invention, Wheatsheaf Press, , UK: Brighton.

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