| Автор | Mulgan, Tim |
| Дата выпуска | 1997 |
| dc.description | A common objection to consequentialism is that it makes unreasonable demands upon moral agents, by failing to allow agents to give special weight to their own personal projects and interests. A prominent recent response to this objection is that of Samuel Scheffler, who seeks to make room for moral agents by building agent-centred prerogatives into a consequentialist moral theory. In this paper, I present a new objection to Scheffler's account. I then sketch an improved prerogative, which avoids this objection by incorporating a non-proportional account of the relationship between values, costs and reasons. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | Cambridge University Press |
| Копирайт | Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997 |
| Название | A Non-proportional Hybrid Moral Theory |
| Тип | research-article |
| DOI | 10.1017/S0953820800005380 |
| Electronic ISSN | 1741-6183 |
| Print ISSN | 0953-8208 |
| Журнал | Utilitas |
| Том | 9 |
| Первая страница | 291 |
| Последняя страница | 306 |
| Аффилиация | Mulgan Tim; University of Otago |
| Выпуск | 3 |
