| Автор | Olson, Jonas |
| Автор | Svensson, Frans |
| Дата выпуска | 2003 |
| dc.description | Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. We consider and reject a number of challenges holding that there is after all such a conflict. We end by suggesting that our proposed position appears quite appealing since it preserves attractive elements from particularism as well as consequentialism. |
| Формат | application.pdf |
| Издатель | Cambridge University Press |
| Копирайт | Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003 |
| Название | A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict |
| Тип | research-article |
| DOI | 10.1017/S0953820800003940 |
| Electronic ISSN | 1741-6183 |
| Print ISSN | 0953-8208 |
| Журнал | Utilitas |
| Том | 15 |
| Первая страница | 194 |
| Последняя страница | 205 |
| Аффилиация | Olson Jonas; Uppsala University |
| Аффилиация | Svensson Frans; Uppsala University |
| Выпуск | 2 |
